Performance ranking is a key factor for investors to make investment decisions such as redemption. Numerous studies have shown that in order to improve and secure the year-end relative performance ranking, mid-year performance rankings have prompted fund managers ranked at different mid-year levels to adjust the risk levels of their portfolios to varying degrees in the second half of the year. This study is of great significance to improve the incentive mechanism of fund companies, investor investment activities and the performance of regulatory responsibilities by state institutions. First of all, this paper makes a full sample study of the risk adjustment behavior of fund manager based on the fund's first-half performance by using the combination table analysis method and regression analysis method, and further studies the relationship between market state and fund manager's risk adjustment behavior. Result: Fund managers (losers) with lower mid-year performance increase portfolio risk more than fund managers (winners) who are at the top of the mid-year performance list. Finally, pay incentives dominate in a bull market, prompting fund managers to increase the risk of their portfolios in the second half of the year in the event of a lower first-half performance ranking, while career worries can have the opposite effect of performance rankings in a bear market.
such incentives may also lead to excessive risk of increasing performance rankings (Taylor (2003) ) [3] .
Why does a fund manager's relative performance ranking affect its risk adjustment for the subsequent period? Existing research provides two explanations for the motivation of fund managers' risk adjustment: salary incentives and career considerations. Goriaev (2005) [4] demonstrates that performance rankings have a greater impact on fund liquidity than yields. In addition, Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996) [5] found that the past performance levels were key factors in investors' decisions to buy the fund. Mutual funds that received the highest returns during the assessment period received the most re-increase in new investments in the Fund. Fund managers tend to maximize short-term performance rankings in order to get more money inflows creating a competitive performance ranking tournament. The study of the dual incentive problem of fund manager sits on the issue of principal-agent between investors and fund managers, which needs further study. Firstly, this paper makes a full sample study of the risk adjustment behavior of fund manager based on the fund's first-half performance by using the combination table analysis method and regression analysis method, and further studies the effect of performance ranking on adjusting behavior in the bull and bear market states. This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the economic tournament literature, especially focusing on the impact of performance ranking on risk adjusting behavior, and then motivate our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology we employ in our empirical investigation, while Sections 4 details the findings of the classification and regression tests we use to support our conclusions. The final section concludes the paper.
Literature Review

Foreign Studies
A great deal of literature suggests that fund managers' risk-choice behavior is influenced by past performance rankings, but the findings are not consistent.
Some studies support the competition hypothesis (e.g. Brown et al.; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Koski and Pontiff, 1999) . These studies found that the worse the medium-term performance, the greater the fund's increased portfolio risk in the second half of the year. Brown et al. (1996) [1] first proposed the fund competition hypothesis that fund managers who had a relatively good or poor mid-year return had the incentive to change their portfolios; By the median annual cumulative rate of return, the losers and winners were found to be more likely to increase portfolio risk in the post-year performance competition than Chevalier and Ellison (1997) [6] looked at the fund's holding characteristics at the end of September and December, and found that the fund did change the level of risk based on past performance rankings to increase expected capital inflows. For example, foundations that underperformed from January to September increased the standard deviation in tracking errors between October and December. Koski and Pontiff (1999) [7] used regression analysis to find that the fund's risk changes were negatively correlated with the fund's performance in the first half of the year.
There are also studies that do not support this hypothesis (e.g. Busse, 2001; Goriaev, etc., 2005) . Busse (2001) [8] used daily earnings data rather than monthly data to estimate the risk of fund returns, using the same approach from Brown et al. (1996) to study the risk-taking behavior of 230 equity funds in 1985-1995, and did not find that Brown did not find that after adjusting for the correlation, Brown was not found to have risk adjustment phenomena found in (1996) . Kempf (2008) [9] looked at the performance tournaments within the fund family and found that managers with lower first-half results chose high risk in large families, while in small families, fund managers who had been ranked at the top of the list chose high risk. Cullen (2012) [10] and others, after distinguishing between the average regression of the fund manager's active adjustment risk level and risk level, found that the fund manager's behavior of actively adjusting risk level is not related to historical performance.
Research in China
In China, there is less literature on the impact of relative performance on fund managers' investment behavior (such as risk-taking behavior). Shi Chenxuan and Liu Xia (2005) [11] , Sun Jing and Qiu Wanhua (2005) [12] , studied that fund managers who ranked lower in the previous performance were more likely to choose high risk, and that new funds were more likely to be risky than older funds. Zhou Yongfeng (2008) [13] changed to the standard deviation of daily yield, replacing the previous one commonly measured by month, and the results also support this conclusion.
There are also studies that have come to different conclusions. Han Dezong and Song Hongyu (2002) [14] used the joint table study to draw the opposite conclusion, the mid-year performance of the top fund managers tend to invest in high risk. Ding Zhenhua (2006) [15] empirical study of the risk-taking behaviour of 55 open-end equity funds listed prior to December 30, 2004 found that the impact of the fund's past performance rankings on the fund's future risk options was uncertain, i.e. some funds increased the risk of portfolios when performance was poor. Another part of the foundation reduces the risk of portfolios when performance is poor. Using the two-dimensional grouping list method of Brown et al. (1996) , a study of the risk-taking behaviour of closed-end funds between 1998 and 2008 found that fund managers did not increase the risk level of their portfolios after becoming losers. The winners also did not reduce the Q. Mu DOI: 10.4236/jss.2020.81006 76 Open Journal of Social Sciences risk level of the portfolio to maintain its performance ranking; Gong Hong (2010) [16] argued that closed-end funds' closed-end operations and "drought and flood protection" had left closed-end fund managers lacking the incentive to improve their performance rankings. Cai Qingfeng and Liu Jin (2012) [17] for the first time combined compensation incentives and career considerations to find that compensation incentives dominate in a bull market, prompting fund managers to increase the risk of increasing their portfolios in the second half of the year in the face of lower first-half results to maximize compensation Career considerations can have the opposite effect of performance rankings in a bear market.
By combing the research of scholars in China and abroad, it is found that the number of research on the "tournament" effect of the fund market in China is relatively small, and there is no consistent conclusion. Some scholars believe that the early winners in order to seek further increase in earnings, more inclined to increase risk. Some scholars have come to the opposite conclusion. In addition, some scholars believe that the fund manager's risk adjustment behavior is also 
Methodology
In order to compare whether the risk adjustment ratio of the loser fund is greater than the risk adjustment ratio of the winning fund, according to Brown et al. (1996) [1] , two variables are established. The first is that each fund's prior net worth growth rate (RTN) is calculated as:
( ) Then, calculate the fund's risk adjustment ratio for the year (RAR):
The standard deviation of the net worth growth rate in the second half of the year and the first half of the year, RAR, reflects the degree of adjustment of fund risk. The methods for measuring whether portfolio risk increases:
The risk adjustment level at a later stage of the fund greater than the median of all samples is considered to be a relative increase in the fund's portfolio risk, while the lower-than-median sample is considered to be relatively less risk-reduced. are the losers. Consistent with the assumptions in this paper, no matter which method is used to define the loser and the winner, the risk adjustment ratio of the loser fund is greater than the risk adjustment ratio of the winning fund, and the difference between the average and median is significant at the 1% significant level. The results show that funds (losers) that rank edgy in the prior year increase the risk of their portfolios to a greater extent than funds (winners) that have the highest performance in the previous year.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Effect of Performance Ranking on Fund Risk Adjustment Behavior
1) T-test of Average Variance and Wilcoxon Test for Median Variance
2) Contingency Table Analysis
According to Brown et al. (1996) [1] , this paper uses a two-dimensional grouping list method to test the extent to which the investment risk of losers and winners changes at a later stage. ranking is even more pronounced. Table 3 shows that losers in the performance ranking tend to try to improve performance in the second half of the year by increasing investment risk, leading to the choice of losers to increase investment risk. In contrast, the top funds managers (winners) are under less pressure and therefore do not choose to increase investment risk. Moreover, the greater the difference in performance rankings, the more likely the losers is to increase risk.
As Panel A in
3) Regression Analysis
The two-dimensional grouping method adopted by Brown et al. (1996) [1] does not take into account the impact of other characteristics of the fund on the risk-taking behavior of the fund manager, so in order to control other factors that may affect the risk-taking behavior of fund managers, this paper uses regression analysis to study the impact of fund managers' performance ranking on fund managers' risk-taking behavior. In our regression analysis, we look at the impact of first-half earnings rankings on fund managers' risk-taking behavior in the second half of the year. The regression model is as follows: values are evenly distributed (0, 1). The higher the value of the variable indicates that the performance of the fund i relative to other funds is better, on the contrary, the worse the performance of the fund. Table 4 shows Rank's coefficient of beta 1 is significantly negative at 1%, indicating that the worse the performance of the Fund relative to other funds of its kind, the greater the risk adjustment of the Fund. In an economic sense, after controlling for other factors, the funds that ranked the worst in the previous performance (i.e., Rank-0) were 15.4% higher than the funds that ranked the best in the previous performance (Rank?-1), and the risk of the assets they held in the latter period was 15.4%.
Market Status and Fund Manager Risk Adjustment
Due to the limitations of the amount of fund data and data structure available for study in China, the empirical results of cross-form classification have some limitations. The following will use market status as a relevant variable to measure the professional pressure faced by fund managers, by applying regression model more reliably to analyze the impact of performance ranking on fund managers' risk adjustment behavior.
Based on the measure of market status above, we divided the five years Table 5 shows that the coefficients in the bear market are significantly negative at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively, and the fund managers who are lagging behind choose a more prudent investment strategy, with positive correlation between performance ranking and risk adjustment. Based on the results of the regression, we can infer that compensation incentives dominate in bull markets and reputational incentives dominate in bear markets.
Robustness Test
For reasons of robustness, other variables are also used in this paper to replace RANK1it's relative performance ranking of fund managers. This paper designs the following virtual variable regression model: RANK_F and RANK0_F is significantly negative, indicating that the risk adjustment of the loser fund is greater than the risk adjustment degree of the winner. The results are robust.
Conclusions
Based on the annual performance ranking, this paper analyzes and studies the risk-taking behavior of funds (managers) from the incentive mechanism faced by fund managers. Fund managers (losers) with lower mid-year results increase portfolio risk more than fund managers (winners) who are at the top of the mid-year performance list. For example, the funds with the worst previous performance were 15.4 per cent higher than those with the best performance in the previous period. Pay incentives dominate in a bull market, prompting fund managers to increase the risk of their portfolios in the second half of the year in the event of a lower first-half performance ranking, while career worries can have the opposite effect on performance rankings in a bear market.
This paper enriches and perfects the literature on fund competition and the risk-taking behavior of fund managers in China. Annual Performance Rankings will trigger the risk-taking behavior of fund managers. It means a lot to fund investors, fund managers and regulators. The fund's performance ranking must take into account the fund's risks and be more concerned with the fund's long performance, not short-term performance.
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